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Introduction  
   
    Since 1989 the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have suffered 
severe setbacks in human development and rises in human poverty - to an extent 
unprecedented in industrial countries during peace time. Crude death rates increased, and 
life expectancy, particularly for men, declined by as much as 5 years in Russia. 
Unemployment and income poverty sharply increased while real wages fell and income 
inequalities increased. Personal security declined due to the weakening of law 
enforcement, military conflicts and the proliferation of crime.  
    The systemic change also brought important gains in terms of human rights and 
political and economic freedom. It opened political choices, started a consumer 
revolution and stimulated entrepreneurship. The paper focuses, however, on the negative 
impact of the transition process which seriously limits, and not, as expected, enlarges 
people's choices. It aims at presenting the magnitude of poverty during the transition 
process in a context of pre-1989 trends. The paper argues that poverty in transition 
countries also has non-income dimensions, and that the reversal of adverse trends in 
income and non-income poverty is urgently needed. Anti-poverty policies should be part 
of a new strategy for transition building on a concept of human development.  
    The paper has four sections. The first section presents the successes and failures of 
socialism in eradicating human poverty. The second and third sections look into the 
changes in human poverty during the transition process. The last section discusses the 
prospects for poverty eradication.  
    The term transition economies refers to former socialist economies of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. It includes the following sub-groups: Eastern Europe (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), the Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria and 
Romania), the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) which includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and the successor states of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia).  
Poverty under socialism  
    This section presents poverty trends under socialism. Estimates of income poverty 
draw on pre-1989 national estimates of poverty in Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and 
Sipos (1992), and on the comparative study on poverty trends in Central and Eastern 
Europe by Milanovic (1991). Reference is also made to national studies for Hungary, 
Ferge (1991), Szalai (1992) and Poland (Golinowska 1995).  
Poverty concept and research  
    Historically, the ideology of socialism grew as a reaction to the human misery of the 
'satanic mills' of capitalism. Socialist states claimed a commitment to the eradication of 
poverty within a framework of a just and equal society with high levels of social security. 
The latter was based on three pillars: full employment, consumer subsidies and a 
universal system of entitlement including free access to social services (health and 
education) and cash benefits which compensated for relatively low and flat wages. State 
enterprises played a key role in this system as life-time employers and providers of 
housing, child care, education and training, medical services, as well as offering leisure 
facilities at low prices or free of charge.  
    Officially, poverty was not recognized as a problem (and the word 'poverty' was not 
used in many countries until the late 1980s). Communist ideologues argued that the 
system provided good chances for a decent life to everyone. With free schooling, steady 
jobs with attached benefits and family allowances, and adequate pensions, there should 
be no poor people under socialism except for personal misfortune (such as serious 
disability or accident). From such a perspective, poverty was associated with pathological 
behaviour and "individual failure" due to lack of effort or as an explicit anti-social 
attitude (Szalai 1992). The poor - often identified with vagrants and "social enemies"2  -- 
received little sympathy from authorities. 3  
   
    But the claim that socialism eradicated poverty oversimplified the situation and many 
countries, including the Soviet Union, recognized the existence of social problems 
including households with low incomes ("Khruchev" minimum budgets). Hungary, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia and some other countries developed poverty research and 
measures to assess the living standards of the population-- "subsistence" and "social" 
minima (Annex: National poverty measures).  
    The concept of poverty in socialist research differed from that in market economies 
(Barr 1994; McAuley 1996). Social minima were designed to capture "underprovision" of 
households (a proxy word for "poverty") as compared to desired consumption patterns. 
The level of social minima was thus relatively high. These concerns were typical of 
poverty research in the former Soviet Union which focused on a "socially acceptable living standard" based on an ideal diet and a set of living conditions that it was hoped all 
members of the former Soviet Union would attain (Mroz and Popkin 1995).  
    The results of socialist research on poverty remained largely confidential, and had little 
impact on anti-poverty policies which were shaped by ideology. Social assistance was 
underdeveloped and social workers were few. The only regular antipoverty programmes 
involved social and disability pensions. During the last two decades of socialism many 
countries used minimum wage policies to support people on low incomes. The poor did 
not have clearly defined rights to claim social assistance. Aid allocations were limited, 
occasional and handed, as Ferge (1991) suggests, only to "the deserving poor". Social 
assistance programmes were managed, at least in Central European countries, at a local 
level, usually through trade unions and municipalities.  
Early success: more incomes, better health and education  
    During the 1950s, 1960s and in some countries up to the mid-1970s, socialism was 
successful in reducing income poverty and improving people's health and education. 
Rapid industrialization created jobs and accelerated the upward mobility of large social 
groups: rural poor, unskilled workers and the jobless, opening up for them new choices 
and opportunities. Higher incomes allowed for a greater food-intake and a better diet. 
Housing and sanitation were upgraded and health coverage was expanded, lowering 
deaths and illnesses due to infectious diseases. Wide access to education dramatically 
improved literacy rates.  
    During 1950-1960 illiteracy dropped to low single digits, infant mortality was reduced 
by half (from 81 to 41 per thousand live births ) and life expectancy increased by 8 years 
for men and almost 10 years for women (Figures 1 and 2). Income poverty declined 
substantially in all countries in the region. In Hungary, the share of the population living 
at or near subsistence (or the social minimum) declined from the estimated 60 per cent in 
the early 1950s to 25 per cent by 1967 and then to 14% by 1972 (Ferge quoted by Sipos 
1992; p. 43).  
    Political freedom was severely restricted however, and poverty was not completely 
eradicated. But income poverty, illiteracy, high deaths rates among children and adults -- 
common in all countries during the pre-war period - were gradually disappearing from 
the region. The early successes of socialism were linked with substantive investment in 
social infrastructure and broad distribution of gains from industrialization. "Catching up" 
effects due to low levels of pre-war development and heavy losses during the WWII also 
played a role.  
The 1970' and 1980's : stagnation and lack of progress  
    However in all countries during the 1970's and 1980's these positive trends stagnated 
or were even reversed - whether in terms of income poverty, life expectancy or health. 
Shortages of consumer goods, including food and housing and of public services such as 
medical care, became a source of severe deprivation. At the same time a lack of concern for the environment during the period of accelerated industrialization started to take its 
toll.  
Health deterioration and a shorter life- span for men  
    By the late 1960s, health trends had deteriorated particularly for middle-aged men. 
Between 1965 and 1985 men's deaths in the USRR and Czechoslovakia rose by 42-44 per 
cent, in Poland and Bulgaria by 56 and 67%, and in Hungary (for men 45-49 years old) 
by 118%. Male life expectancy fell by one year with larger drops for Hungary (2.5 years) 
and the USSR (3 years). Health trends for women changed less but the improvement in 
life expectancy was sluggish (Figure 1 and 2).  
    The health trends in the region diverged from global trends. The gap in life expectancy 
between the countries of Eastern Europe and South-Western Europe (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) - which had already closed around 1965 -- opened again. During the 
late 1980s the region also lost its relative advantage vis-a-vis the advanced Latin 
American countries (Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay). Negative health trends in the 
region had stabilized, however, by the late 1980s and life expectancy started to rise again 
after 1985 (1987 for the USSR).  
    The main cause behind the rise of male mortality was the increased incidence of heart 
diseases and many of the premature deaths can be explained by an unhealthy diet and 
lifestyle--low intake of quality meat, fresh vegetables and fruits, a high consumption of 
cholesterol-rich food, heavy smoking and excessive consumption of alcohol. In the 
USSR, deaths due to alcohol poisoning quadrupled between the mid-1960s and 1978 
(increasing from 12,500 to 51,000). In 1978 the total number of alcohol-related deaths 
(both directly and indirectly), was estimated at around 400,000 (i.e. almost a third of total 
deaths) (UNICEF 1994, p 26-29).  
Environmental degradation  
    Accelerated industrialization, urbanization and intensive farming had environmental 
costs. Chemical pesticides and fertilizers along with industrial waste and sewage polluted 
the region's air, water and soil - a result of the lack of effective water treatment facilities 
in most urban areas and of anti-pollution equipment in industry. At the end of the 1980s, 
pollution levels were much higher than elsewhere in the industrialized world.  
    By the end of 1980 some 17% of the territory of the former Soviet Union was officially 
declared to be in ecological crisis due to high levels of environmental pollution. The 
Chernobyl area in Ukraine and the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan are extreme cases of 
environmental damage. The Chernobyl accident in April 1986 affected more than 4 
million people in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, over a total area of 25,00 square 
kilometers. The health impact on adults and particularly on children is now well 
documented - including premature deaths, damage to the immune system, chronic 
pathologies and accelerated ageing. The human costs of this tragedy also include a loss of assets, particularly land, as well as psychological trauma related both to reallocation and 
to anxiety about future health (Ukraine: NHDR 1995 and 1996).  
    In Uzbekistan, irrigation systems, built during the early days of socialism, fed by rivers 
that flow to the Aral, deprived the sea of large amounts of water. In addition the intensive 
agriculture and cotton industries developed in the Aral region polluted waters with 
fertilizers and industrial waste. Since 1960 about 3,400 square kilometers of sea have 
dried up and fishing villages are now some 40 kilometers away from the coastline. People 
in fishing villages lost their jobs and suffer from ill health (Transition, Nov-Dec.1995).  
    People in Eastern Europe also lived in a contaminated environment. The area called the 
"Black Triangle", located at the boundary of Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany, 
which has a concentration of heavy industry is regarded as the most polluted area in the 
world. The former Czechoslovakia has consistently had the world's highest toxic 
emissions per capita. Studies confirm a higher risk of respiratory diseases, allergies, 
retarded intellectual development and anemia among children in this region.  
    The degradation of the environment in former socialist countries affected the 
sustainability of human development. The Chernobyl accident in particular raised 
awareness of the risks from nuclear power plants using Soviet-made reactors and from 
radioactive waste from military activity.  
The rise of urban poverty in Eastern and Central Europe  
    In Eastern and Central Europe during the last two decades of socialism the incidence of 
income poverty increased substantially - in Poland rising from less than 10% to 23% of 
the population, and in Yugoslavia from 17% to 25%. In Czechoslovakia it stabilized at 
7.5% and in Hungary at 10-17% (based on national income minima: Atkinson and 
Micklewright 1992; p.236).  
    The greatest increases were in the urban areas. Between 1978 and 1987, the poverty 
rates for Polish urban workers increased fourfold, from 6% to 25%, and for Yugoslavian 
urban workers they more than doubled, rising from 9% to 20%. In these two countries, 
the position of urban workers -- mostly white and blue collar workers in the socialized 
sector -- deteriorated as compared to farmers and pensioners. In the 1970s poverty among 
urban workers in Poland was less than one-half of that of farmers and in Yugoslavia less 
than one-quarter. These advantages disappeared in 1987 (Milanovic 1991; p.146). Scarce 
data suggest that in Romania too non-agricultural households were more likely to fall into 
poverty than farming households (Sipos 1992).  
    The risk of child poverty increased despite universal child and family support systems. 
During the 1980s even in Czechoslovakia - where total poverty rates were the lowest in 
the region - child poverty was a concern (Cornia and Sipos 1991).  
Rural poverty, low pensions and income inequalities in the Soviet Union.      The lack of an official poverty line prior to 1988 prevents an assessment of longer term 
trends. But there is no doubt that in the early decades of socialism people lived in 
miserable conditions, during the 1930s in Ukraine, for example, there was a massive 
famine. A number of people also lived on low incomes during the 1960s and 1970s 
(Matthews 1972; McAuley 1979). McAuley (1996) suggests that the incidence of poverty 
as measured by various poverty lines increased during 1980-1989.  
    The first official poverty assessment for the Soviet Union is based on the 1988 
Goscomstat subsistence minimum (81 or 88 rubles depending on the prices used). 
According to this poverty line 40 million people - about 14% of the Soviet population - 
lived in poverty in 1989. The Goscomstat minimum (1988) was used in many studies 
(often adjusted downwards or upwards). Mroz and Popkin (1995), for example, use a 100 
rubles cutoff line which results in a 16% poverty rate (1989).  
    Two features are typical of poverty in the Soviet Union during the pre-transition 
period. First, the difficult situation of the elderly --particularly in rural areas-- due to the 
low level of pensions. At the end of the 1980s over 90 per cent of the pensions of 
collective farm workers were concentrated in the two lowest brackets (up to 60 and up to 
80 rubles) while only half of pensions of workers were at that level (Atkinson and 
Micklewright p. 238). Second, relatively high income inequalities. According to Atkinson 
and Micklewright (p.103), income inequality among Soviet households was not only the 
highest among socialist countries but was also comparable to (or even slightly higher 
than) income inequality in the UK. High income inequality was suggested also by 
Bergson (1984).  
    High income inequality in the Soviet Union was largely explained by variations in 
income distribution between republics. The incidence of low income was uncommon in 
the north (the Baltics) but more frequent when moving south. By the end of the 1980s 
over half of the low- income population in the Soviet Union lived in five Central Asian 
republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan 
had the largest population with incomes below 75 roubles --over 27% of total population. 
In Russia the share of people on low income was only 3.2%. Overall, Russia, with half 
the population of the USSR, had slightly less than a quarter of all people living at the 
lowest income (Atkinson and Micklewright p. 240-241).  
    Data on low income, however, should be interpreted with caution. Low income data do 
not take account of differences between the republics in household size, price levels, 
incomes from private plots and consumption patterns. Mountain shepherds in Uzbekistan 
--one of the poorest groups in the Soviet Union as measured by low income data -- also 
had access to extra earnings from private sales of meat. And their consumption patterns 
differed from those in urban centers. It is a rare Uzbek, who, as Lubin points out (Lubin 
1984: p. 198-199), "dreams of trips to Paris, or even to Eastern Europe..., rarely would he 
or she wish to buy washing machines, or Soviet household amenities". Uzbek shepherds, 
Lubin argues, were very poor only by Western standards and " [w]ithin the framework of 
indigenous lifestyle, quite the opposite could well be the case".  Individual failure versus systemic failure  
    Poverty under socialism had systemic, and not individual causes as believed by 
ideologues. The command economy could not generate enough resources fora steady 
improvement in material standards of the population and maintenance of social 
provisions. Economic failure of the system was due to the lack of mechanisms to 
stimulate technological innovations, labour productivity and entrepreneurship. Inefficient 
allocation of resources resulted in chronic shortages of housing, consumer goods 
(including non- basic food) and deteriorating access to social infrastructure (Kornai's 
shortage economy). Resource transfers from abroad, used during the 1970s to protect 
living standards, had dried up during the 1980s due to the large external deficits of most 
socialist countries .  
    The education and health sectors suffered from shortages of funding, bad management 
and resource allocation. During the 1980's medical services deteriorated in terms of both 
access and quality. The shortages of modern equipment, drugs and specialized medical 
staff hampered the ability to respond to 'new' diseases typical of societies where people 
live longer -- including cardiovascular, chronic and degenerative diseases. The long 
waiting lists for hospital places or for seeing a specialist encouraged payments to doctors. 
Overcrowded facilities were not modernized and lacked basic supplies (antiseptics, 
syringes, drugs) and medical equipment. The condition of health facilities was 
particularly bad in the Soviet Union. In 1988, one fourth of maternity hospitals had no 
hot water and 10% had no heating, 24% of hospitals had no sewage and 15% had no 
proper water supplies, 70% of children's hospitals lacked equipment to deal with 
emergency situations (Fenshback and Friendly 1992).  
    Late socialism was also characterized by widespread disillusion with socialist 
ideology. Political participation of workers in the decision making process was only a 
slogan and personal freedom was severely restricted. Channels of upward mobility 
became narrow and success often depended on political loyalty. In the 1980s access to 
social benefits narrowed. Access to housing and most consumer goods including food 
such as quality meat required bribes or privileges. Frustration was common. The 
Solidarity movement, born in Poland at the beginning of the 1980s to demand political 
participation and improvements in living conditions, helped voice similar concerns in 
other countries.  
Summary and conclusions  
    Despite official claims, socialism did not create the conditions for sustainable human 
development. It massively repressed political freedom. Significant progress during the 
1950s and 1960s in education, health, income and consumption, was followed by 
stagnation or even reversal. By the end of the 1980s many noticeably lived below 
national poverty lines - in Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the former Soviet Union 
particularly in the central Asian republics.      People's choices became substantially restricted due to political exclusion, shortages of 
consumer goods and low incomes, narrowing access to social services and degradation of 
the natural environment. Political concerns, rigidity of command system and 
communication problems did not allow for reforms within the system. Transition to 
market democracy had widespread social support in all countries. However, the results 
were far below the expectations.  
 
Income poverty during transition  
   
    Since the beginning of the transition process income poverty increased in all countries 
in the region. Impoverishment of people reflected economic crisis - a steep fall in output, 
massive unemployment, a fall in real wages and a rise in income inequalities. This 
section presents trends in income poverty since 1989.  
Data sources and problems  
    Internationally comparable data in this section are from Milanovic (1996) and 
UNICEF (1995). These two sets of poverty estimates are based on Household Budget 
Surveys (HBS) adjusted by macro - data (whenever they were higher than income from 
HBS) but differ in country coverage and methodology, including poverty line. Milanovic 
estimates are based on a poverty line of $ 4 a day 1990 purchasing power parities (PPPs) 
and UNICEF (1995) on a poverty line equal to 60% of low income (low income was 
defined as 35-60% of the 1989 average wage). Other data used in this section include 
estimates for Luxembourg Income Study for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia (A. Szulc 1996; Boyle Torrey et al 1996) which use both absolute (corrected 
social minimum) and relative poverty line (percentage of median income). Occasional 
reference is made to national poverty estimates.  
    Presented data should be treated only as indicative. All poverty estimates for transition 
economies, and particularly for the CIS, are subject to major statistical difficulties. The 
size of the "shadow economy"4  , new design of HBS, weakness of national income 
statistics, rapid changes of prices (and thus purchasing power parities-PPPs), wages and 
incomes distort the results. In many countries, for example, HBS include now larger 
representation of high-risk groups (the unemployed, minorities, large families) which 
pushes upwards poverty rates. Underreporting of incomes has similar effects. Poverty 
rates based on expenditures (disclosed more openly than incomes) are lower that those 
based on incomes by a few percentage points in six transition countries (out of seven) for 
which such data were available (Milanovic 1996 p.100). Also the use of 1993 PPPs 
(instead of 1990 PPPs) modifies estimates for individual countries --by as much as 16-18 
percentage points downwards for Bulgaria and Lithuania and 10-12 percentage points 
upwards for most central Asian republics. Overall, the use of 1993 PPPs increases the 
percentage of the population living below the poverty line of $ 4 a day in transition 
countries from 32 % to 40% (Milanovic 1997 forthcoming).  
    Poverty estimates based on $ 4 a day also reflect the problems of using the same 
poverty line for countries with different levels of development. Such a line could be too low for the richer countries of central Europe (underestimation of poverty rates) and too 
high for many CIS countries (overestimation of poverty rates) (Zukowski 1995). It also 
has to be pointed out that few or no data exist for the former Yugoslovia and the 
Caucasus countries which are among those worst affected by poverty.  
A steep increase in poverty  
    All estimates show a steep increase of income poverty between 1988 and 1994. 
According to $4 a day poverty line (1990 PPPs) the total number of poor people rose 
more than tenfold-- from 14 million to over 119 million raising the percentage of 
population living below the poverty line from 4 % to 32% (table 1). By $ 1 a day --a 
World Bank poverty line for developing countries--the increase of poverty in transition 
countries was sixfold but poverty rates were low. Between 1987 and 1993 the poverty 
rate for the region increased from 0.6% to 3.5% of the total population (World Bank, 
1996 p.4).  
    UNICEF estimates show a similar trend (table 2). Between 1989 and 1994 an 
additional 75 million people in the region fell into poverty (excluding the Central Asian 
Republics and Kazakhstan as well as former Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia). According 
to UNICEF estimates, about 8% of the Central European population and 35% of the 
population in the rest of the region, is poor. Some 110 million people live on low incomes 
and are at risk of falling into poverty.  
    As compared to the pre-1989 period geographical distribution of poverty has changed. 
Most poor people in the region now live in Russia and the Slavic countries of CIS (as 
compared to central Asia). In Eastern and Central Europe most poor live in the Balkans 
and in Poland Figure 3.  
An uneven pattern of poverty increase  
    The rise of in poverty was uneven by country. Five groups of countries with broadly 
similar trends and poverty levels can be identified: (i) Central Europe; (ii) the Balkans 
and Poland; (iii) the Baltics and Slavic republics of the CIS and (iv) the Central Asian 
republics of the CIS, (v) Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia).  
- Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) where pre-
1989 levels of poverty were low and the increase was modest. The poverty incidence rose 
from around 0% to less than 2% (Milanovic) and less than 6% (UNICEF). 
Impoverishment of people in these countries, however, is demonstrated by UNICEF 
estimates of population with low income, which increased substantially, except for 
Slovenia.  
- Poland and the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania) where pre-1989 poverty was noticeable 
and the increase significant reaching double digits. Included in this group is Poland, the 
only country of Central Europe with high poverty rates.  
- The Baltics and Slavic republics of the CIS (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). This group of countries experienced a sharp increase in poverty to around 40% from low pre-1989 levels. Poverty increase differed by country--
rising to 23% in Belarus and Latvia, to 40%-46% in Estonia, Ukraine and Russia and 
65% in Moldova. UNICEF data show a similar pattern of poverty increase for the Baltics 
and Moldova.  
- The Central Asian republics of the CIS (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan). Here pre-1989 poverty was significant --in double digits, 
except for Kazakhstan--and the increase during the transition process was very steep, 
resulting in poverty rates above 50% of the total population and as high as 76% in 
Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, according to national estimates, 80%-90% of the population 
was below the poverty line in 1993 (NHDR :Tajikistan 1996).  
- The Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia). All these countries have 
very high poverty rates and suffer from effects of military conflicts and collapse of civil 
society. Poverty estimates based on $ 4 a day are not available for these countries. 
According to UNICEF around 65% of population in Azerbaijan live below the poverty 
line. But recent national estimates show that than 90% of people in Azerbaijan are below 
minimum consumption (Azerbaijan: NHDR 1996 p.25).5 In Georgia, wages in the state 
sector ($3-5 a month) are far below estimated costs of minimum subsistence ($ 31 a 
month for an active adult) (UNDP 1996 p. 73).  
Why did income poverty increase?  
    Sudden impoverishment of population is explained by a drastic fall in real wages and 
an increase in income inequalities. Initially, poverty was driven by the fall of GDP, real 
wages and incomes. After the steep rise in 1990-1992, poverty rates stabilized in most 
countries or fluctuated within a narrow range (except for the Czech Republic and Estonia 
where they declined). In the second phase of reform (around 1993) poverty increases 
began to be driven by the income inequalities. The latter was led by many factors 
including liberalization, privatization and wage dispersion. The increase in wage 
inequalities was largely explained by the fast growth in earnings of skilled white-collar 
workers (Rutkowski 1996).  
    The extent of the fall of GDP, real wages and incomes differed among countries. It was 
generally much larger in the CIS countries and in the Baltics than in Eastern Europe. 
While in the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland the GDP declined at most by 25% as 
compared to 1989 (except for the former Yugoslavia), in the CIS countries and in the 
Baltics the decline of GDP was on average close to 50% Similar differences are also seen 
in levels of decline of personal incomes and wages. Minimum wage is now below 35% of 
average wage in 11 countries (out of 16), and is as low as 9% in Azerbaijan, Belarus and 
Russia (table 3 and 4).  
    The increase in inequality, though seen in all countries, was particularly striking in 
Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Russia and some CIS countries where GINI coefficients rose 
from 25 or less to 35-40 and above-- to about 50 in Kyrgyzstan (1993). In 1993 the top 
quintile of people in Russia received 20 percentage points more of total income than the 
top quintile did in 1988 -- mainly because of an explosive increase in the relative share of 
the very rich (World Bank 1996 p. 69).      Falling incomes have caused changes in household expenditure. The 'food share' now 
accounts for 60% or more of expenditures in Romania, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine. And 
over 70% in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Even in a few countries where 
'food share' declined the 'basic needs share' in household expenditures increased. 
Consumption of meat, fish and related products declined by half in Estonia and Ukraine. 
In the Caucasus countries meat consumption declined from 40-50 kilograms to 10-17 
kilograms per capita between 1989 and 1995 (table 5).  
The losers: the "working poor", the unemployed and children  
    Income poverty is mainly associated with low pay, unemployment, youth and low 
education. In surveys, poverty is analyzed according to socio-economic groups and 
demographic characteristics. However, in real life many of the losers have several risk 
factors. As well as having no work many of the unemployed are also young, low skilled, 
have large families and live in rural areas or small towns - a group of characteristics that 
greatly increases the risk of poverty.  
The "Working poor"  
    Most people in transition countries fall into poverty because their earnings from work 
are very low. In Russia in 1993, 66% of poor people had jobs and in Poland 60% (World 
Bank 1996a pp. 15 and 115). In many countries even a two-earner household cannot keep 
the family with two children above the poverty line. In Russia the ratio between the 
average wage and the poverty line fell from 4:1 to 3:1 and in Ukraine from 4:1 to below 2 
which pulled a two-earner Russian family down to just above the poverty line and 
Ukrainian family down below that line.6  A Polish two- earner family is less vulnerable 
but a family with only one working adult will still float around the poverty line 
(Milanovic 1996; p.125-127)). Under such circumstances women's paid work is an 
economic necessity.  
    People accept low pay because they have few job opportunities. Being formally 
employed in the state sector also allows them to maintain social benefits linked to the job 
such as cheap housing. In FYR Macedonia, Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic one fifth of all workers fall into the low pay category (Rutkowski 1996 p.20). 
Low pay is common in Russia and the CIS countries where wage arrears worsen the 
situation. During 1993 and 1994 only 40% of the workforce in Russia was being paid 
fully and on time (VICIOM survey data in Klugman 1996; p.6). Keeping workers on low 
pay and delaying payment permit state enterprises to avoid massive lay-offs and keep the 
unemployment rate at artificially low level in Russia and many CIS countries (Standing 
1996, 1995).  
    It is interesting to notice that being self-employed does not protect people from poverty 
as in Romania, Belarus and Slovakia. This may be explained by the vulnerability of small 
operations -- street vendors or family business -- which account for a large share of self-
employment. Farmers also have higher than average risk from poverty (as compared to 
worker and pensioner households) (Milanovic 1996).  The unemployed  
    Unemployment is strongly linked to poverty. In Milanovic study households with at 
least one unemployed person have poverty rates that are between 1 1/2 (Russia, Belorus, 
Romania) and 4 times higher (Poland) than the country average. In Poland and Bulgaria, 
unemployment explains around 30-35% of poverty (Milanovic 1996 pp. 120-123). Also 
Szulc's (1996) results show strong correlation of poverty with unemployment in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
    Unemployment rates differ substantially by country. They are still low in the Baltics 
States (5-7%) and the CIS countries (1-4%, except for Armenia and Russia where they 
are 8-9%).  
    In Eastern Europe, except for the Czech Republic, unemployment rates are much 
higher, reaching double digits (UN ECE 1997). Despite differences in unemployment 
rates its structure is similar and is characterized by high levels of unemployment among 
women and youth. In Estonia 70% of all unemployed are women and in the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Russia around 60% . The share of youth in total unemployment is 
close to one third in a number of countries (in Romania it is almost 50%). Many countries 
also have high shares of long-term unemployed --as high 60% in Bulgaria and close to 
above 50% in Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia (table 6).  
The unskilled and low educated  
    In countries for which data is available there is almost no poverty among university 
graduates, except for Slovakia and Belarus. This is in sharp contrast with households 
headed by a person with only elementary education where the poverty risk is 20-60% 
above the average. Secondary education reduces the probability to less than half the 
average (Milanovic 1996 p.134). Szulc (1996) comes to similar conclusions.  
    Vocational skills, as a risk factor, differ by country according to the speed of industrial 
restructuring during which vocational skills learned in the past become obsolete. That is 
why in Poland and the Czech Republic, workers with vocational skills are more likely to 
be poor than in Slovakia and Belarus.  
Children's poverty  
    Since 1989, children's poverty increased and is now higher than for other vulnerable 
group --the elderly (figure 4). In Russia children poverty rates tracked the movement of 
household incomes and after the decline in 1993-1994 the rates increased in 1995. Also 
the prevalence of chronic malnutrition among Russian children (two years and younger) 
increased - from 9.4% in September 1992 to 14.3% in October 1995 (RLMS 1992-1995).  
Poverty rates are particularly high for children in single parent families and large families 
- in Russia 72% of families with three or more children are poor (UNICEF 1995 p. 9). 
Poverty rates for five-member families were between 150% and 250% higher than the 
average in countries included in Milanovic study.      The difference in poverty rates between children and the elderly is usually explained 
by better protection of pensions as compared to wages, unemployment and family 
benefits. The elderly are organized and are important as voters. Many also take early 
retirement -- a policy supported by governments -- and have extra incomes from small 
jobs. Income from pensions is steady in transition economies, and is often supplemented 
by extra incomes, while parents which children have insecure and low-paid jobs and 
families are less protected by social benefits (Cornia 1995; Fajth 1996; UNICEF 1995).  
    Between 1992 and 1996 family related social benefits were cut back disproportionately 
in most countries. The share of family allowances and maternity benefits declined in 
absolute value due to the steep fall in GDP, and in a number of countries also in relative 
terms - as in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (table 8).  
    A few countries -- such as Hungary -- managed, however, to protect family benefits 
and these were effective in keeping households out of poverty. In Hungary the risk of 
being in the lowest 20% of income distribution would have been 27% and 52% for 
families with one child and three children respectively without family benefits -- instead 
of 19% and 26% (Bagdy 1996).  
   
Female poverty  
    The absence of consistent and comparable gender-sensitive household surveys and the 
lack of information on the intra-household distribution of resources limit analysis of 
female poverty. Studies, however, show a slightly higher poverty risk for females and 
female-headed households compared with men and male-headed households. The clearest 
example is Hungary. Poverty rates differ markedly between female- and male-headed 
households, especially if they are single adults with children (World Bank 1996c). In 
other transition economies such differences are small and depend on age. Elderly women 
are much more likely to be poor than elderly men. Poverty rates decrease for elderly men 
and for male-headed households in all countries and increase (Poland) or remain 
unchanged (Bulgaria, Russia) for women and female-headed households (Milanovic 
1996). Also Szulc (1996) shows that a female headed household is one of three variables 
(along with unemployment and level of education) associated with poverty risk in the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and in particular in Hungary.  
    Despite limited data from household surveys, an increase of female poverty since 1989 
could be argued on several grounds (Ruminska-Zimny 1995). Women are exposed to 
labour-related poverty due to high female unemployment rates, which except in Hungary 
and Slovakia are higher than those for men (table 6) and traditionally low wages, by some 
20-25% lower than men's. During the transition the wage gap between women and men 
has widened in several countries, such as in Latvia and Estonia. In 1994 in Latvia the 
female average wage was only 77% of males as compared to 81% (1992) and in Estonia 
73% (1993) as compared to 80% (1992) (NHDR: Estonia 1995 and ECE/INSTRAW). 
The wage gap, however, diminished in Poland and Slovenia (World Bank 1996b p. 73).      Although it is true that women in many countries became successful entrepreneurs, 
most of them integrate more slowly than men into the private sector. New female jobs are 
difficult to find partly including due to the discriminatory hiring practices of private 
companies and unfavorable social climate. Many politicians in the region acknowledge 
that men's employment is a priority, encouraging women to stay home. Many feminized 
sectors of economy -- state administration and social sector (health, culture) -- are under 
steady pressure for labour cuts, and opportunities for taking advantage of the expansion 
of other feminized sectors --such as banking and financial services--are limited. The most 
serious constraint in competing for new, well paid jobs in the service sectors is women's 
lack of time to upgrade their knowledge and skills to the new requirements of market 
system, and many new jobs go to men.  
    Women were also most affected by the erosion of family related benefits. 
Demographic trends -- the rapid increase of births to unmarried mothers (the rate more 
than doubled in Bulgaria and is over 44% in Estonia figure 5), the rise in divorce rates 
(Russia, Ukraine) and the rising death rates for middle-aged men -- strengthen this effect. 
More women than in the pre-1989 period, form single-parent households, which are now 
less protected by maternity benefits and child-related transfers -- leading to poverty. In 
Poland in 1992, 67% of single mothers lived below the subsistence minimum ("Polityka", 
8 June 1996).  
    Female poverty in transition economies has thus a time context. Since 1989 the 
pressure on women's time increased substantially. Women's paid work is an economic 
necessity and they have to adjust to more competitive labour market. At the same time 
they become more involved in household maintenance and family care. Survival 
strategies include cuts of commercial services -- laundry, clothing repairs, cooking and 
shrinking social protection increases the demand for 'caring' work.  
    Difficulties to reconcile productive, reproductive and "maintenance" functions result in 
"time poverty" which narrows access to basic capabilities -- health and in particular 
education. The lack of time to go to a doctor affects women's health. The lack of time to 
learn market skills increases the risk of unemployment and poverty. Vulnerability to 
"time" poverty is particularly high among single mothers. Young women in the region 
delay childbearing and marriage more often now than before 1989 as reflected by 
declining fertility and marriage rates.  
Declining regions and small towns  
    In the countries of eastern Europe income poverty is greater in the smaller towns and 
cities. (Milanovic 1996). This is largely explained by the better skills and education of 
people living in big cities and the diversity of employment opportunities, particularly in 
capitals such as Prague, Budapest or Warsaw. In Russia, the poverty rates in Moscow or 
St. Petersburg are less than 10% while in Altai territory (Russian Central Asia) it is 70% 
(World Bank 1996b p.70).      Regional differences in poverty rates are also partly due to the economically irrational 
siting of industries -- often creating one-company towns. Large state enterprises in 
engineering, metallurgy, mining -- the old leaders of industrialization -- around which 
these towns were built are going now through privatization and restructuring. They are 
reducing expenditures by cutting labour and also by getting rid of the 'social' burden -- 
day-care and medical centers, sports facilities, vacation resorts and houses they once 
owned and managed. In Slovakia the number of enterprise-run kindergartens declined 
from 773 in 1989 to only 196 in 1992 (Fajth 1994 p. 28). Though formally most of the 
social infrastructure has been taken over by the state in practice it is eventually being 
commercialized, privatized or abandoned. Enterprise restructuring thus affects jobs and 
social services.  
    So far, few countries have tackled the problem successfully. The most common 
approach is "wait and see" and the slow down of the restructuring process under social 
pressure.  
The poverty gap and its dynamics  
    The distance between the income levels of the poor and the poverty line in most 
transition countries is relatively 'shallow' --around 25%-30% as compared to a typical gap 
in middle income countries of 35%-40% (Milanovic 1996) and consumption patterns, 
assets, health or education level do not differ much between poor and non-poor. In 
Poland, as often quoted, 20% of recipients of social assistance own cars and 60% own 
color TV sets (GUS 1993 p.21). Also, as suggested by panel data, many poor people also 
move out of poverty fairly quickly. In Russia 63% of those in poverty in 1992 came out 
of it in 1993, and only 27.5% of very poor remained in the same situation (Mroz and 
Popkin, 1994).  
    Is poverty in the 1990s "less oppressive" than pre-1989? Such views are argued not 
only on grounds of the shallowness of the poverty gap but also because of the consumer 
revolution which allows for more rational budgeting, the lack of queuing, and the 
increase in leisure time (Szulc 1996). From the point of view of poor people this is a 
highly speculative argument. True, in the past incomes were stagnant, and often could not 
be exchanged for goods or services, but incomes were secure. Now, for large social 
groups the levels and security of their income have declined. For most people on low 
income there was no enlargement of consumer choice. And many feel even more 
excluded than in the past from the standard consumption norm.  
    The "shallowness" of the poverty gap should also be considered at an individual level. 
Many of the elderly, such as pensioners, with no link to the labour markets or workers 
about to retire stay in poverty forever once they slip below the poverty line. They then 
depend either on family support or on government policy to lift them out of poverty. 
Younger people (such as the short-term unemployed) -- particularly the more educated -- 
can escape from poverty on their own by learning new skills for example, or by moving 
to where there are jobs.      The uneven pattern of moving out of poverty is illustrated by the emergence of pockets 
of deep poverty in several countries. In Hungary -- one of the most advanced reformers in 
the region -- the number of the very poor is estimated at 500,000 people or 5% of the 
population. These people fall into four groups: households headed by a person who has 
been unemployed for more than a year (usually middle-age men with low levels of 
education); people with irregular connections with labour market: women on extended 
maternity leaves; and elderly female pensioners living alone (World Bank 1996c).  
Anti-poverty policies  
    Social policies have had a limited impact on poverty alleviation. During the first phase 
of the transition process, when the poverty increase was the steepest, the government 
priority was to move quickly towards a market economy. At that time, policy makers -- 
and the international community -- believed in an optimistic scenario for the transition 
process and transient character of poverty. Growth revival was expected to have an 
"accordion-like" effect pulling people out of poverty (World Bank 1996a).7  The social 
policies of the early 1990s also avoided reference to solidarity, stressing instead self-
reliance and individual responsibility (UNICEF 1995).  
    During the initial stage of "shock therapy" governments abandoned two pillars of the 
socialist welfare system: full employment and consumer subsidies (including those for 
housing and utilities). Under the pressure of contracting economies and shrinking tax 
bases they also allowed for the erosion of the third (and last) element of the old welfare 
system - cash transfers and free public services - even if the share of some social 
expenditures in GDP, such as unemployment benefits and pensions, increased in most 
countries.  
    The erosion of state protection occurred through several channels: a drop in the real 
value of public spending due to the contraction of GDP, the ineffective indexation of 
many cash transfers, the decentralization of responsibilities without transferring 
resources, and the commercialization of some services and benefits. The changes in 
social protection provided through enterprises were also abrupt and compounded the 
effects of shrinking state protection.  
    Anti-poverty actions lacked resources and social infrastructure, including trained staff. 
Since 1989 governments have had to establish a market-oriented social safety net for 
unemployment benefits and social assistance. Many countries started with the basics such 
as establishing data collection, poverty lines, and procedures for screening and 
monitoring.  
Summary and conclusions  
    Since the beginning of the transition process income poverty as measured by any real 
poverty line has increased in all transition economies. However, the increase differed 
from one country to another. Most poor people in the region now live in the Caucasus, 
Russia, Slavic countries of the CIS and central Asian countries.      The rise in poverty was widespread. And large segments of the population were pulled 
down below the poverty line, including the socialist middle-class: production workers, 
teachers, doctors, clerical staff and administrators as a result of fall of GDP and average 
wage, rise of unemployment and growing income inequality. In many countries a family 
of four with two working adults still had incomes close to or below the poverty line 
which explains the high poverty rates among children. People with low levels of 
education, those living in rural areas and small towns, as well women, had a high risk of 
poverty.  
    Policies have limited effects on alleviating poverty. The number of recipients of social 
assistance increased more quickly than resources. The welfare system of the past was 
substantially curtailed, partly due to the collapse of the social function of the labour 
market. Market-style social assistance schemes were just emerging and could not cope 
with sudden and across-the-board falls in incomes, worsening income distributions, open 
unemployment, and growing poverty.  
Beyond income poverty: human costs of transition  
    The transition process caused even more dramatic human costs than income losses. 
Most severe costs were the results of military conflicts and the health losses as reflected 
by rising death rates and the population crisis. This section also discusses the impact of 
the transition process on education and social exclusion.  
The death and population crisis  
    The transition process has been accompanied by a population crisis never seen before 
in peace time in industrial countries. More people were dying than being born and the life 
span and population declined. The 'excess' deaths over the 1989-1994 period is estimated 
at 2 million people (Cornia 1996a;p.1). In 1994 only ten countries in the world had 
negative population growth. Nine were former socialist countries -- five former Soviet 
republics: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Russia, Ukraine, as well as Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Hungary and Romania. The tenth country with declining population was Germany which 
included east Germany, a former centrally planned economy. Crude marriage rates 
(CMR) also declined. Between 1989 and 1994 CMR dropped between 13% in Romania 
and 51% in Estonia. On average, the decline was at least twice as large as that recorded 
over the previous two decades (Cornia and Paniccia 1996; p.97).  
    The death rate increased fastest during the first two years of the transition process 
though the rises differed from one country to another. The increase in deaths was steepest 
in Russia and the Baltic States. In 1995 death rates stabilized in a number of countries, 
including Russia, though the upward trend continues in 'late' or 'inconsistent' reformers: 
Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Azerbaijan. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland 
it was modest and was followed by a return to pre-1989 trends. In Hungary, Romania and 
Bulgaria the crisis was more pronounced and death rates remained at higher, pre-1989, 
levels.      In all countries more men -- in particular aged 24-54 -- were dying than women. The 
rise of deaths was due to an increase in cardiovascular diseases (mainly for older men) 
and accidents, suicide, substance abuse and murder (mainly for younger men). During the 
first year of transition male life expectancy fell in all countries. Men in 11 countries (out 
of 17) expect now to have a shorter life span than in 1989. Life expectancy for women 
declined less. In 1995 it was, however, still below 1989 levels in 7 countries (out of 18). 
The largest decline was in Albania (-1.2 years) and Russia (-1.9 years). (table 9 and 
figure 6).  
    In Russia between 1989 and 1995 male life expectancy declined by 5 years (and if 
comparison is made between peak years--that is 1987 (high) and 1994 (low) --the decline 
in male life expectancy was 9 years). Russian men can now expect to live slightly over 58 
years -- almost two years short of the official retirement age. That is less than men in 
two-thirds of developing countries including India (60.6) and Pakistan (60.9), and similar 
to men in Lesotho and Bolivia. Men in industrialized and rich Northern parts of Russia 
had shorter life expectancies than men in poorer and less prosperous Southern parts (in 
particular the Northern Caucasus). Female life expectancy in Russia -- which declined 
less -- is now similar to that of women in China and the Dominican Republic, and is still 
lower than in a quarter of developing countries (Cornia 1996;p.6).  
    Mothers and children were less affected by the health crisis. Maternal mortality rates 
improved or stagnated in all countries, except Bulgaria, Poland and Russia. Infant 
mortality rates (IMR) were erratic. In 1995 IMR was higher than in 1989 in several 
countries including Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus. A few countries also experienced 
higher under-5 mortality rates (table 10).  
    The depth of the mortality and population crisis was not proportional to the fall in 
output and GDP. Some 'better off' countries, such as Hungary, experienced a more severe 
deterioration, than 'worse-off' countries such as Albania or Armenia (UNICEF 1995 p. 
20-22). Adult males at age 15 in Hungary, one of the wealthiest countries, would have 
more than twice the chance of dying within the next 50 years compared with their 
counterparts in Albania, one of the poorest countries (Goldstein et al. 1996 p. 14)  
Why the crisis?  
    The sudden rise in death rates is poorly explained. Mainstream arguments link the 
crisis partly with pre-1989 trends in health status and statistical problems. Factors to 
blame for the sudden rise of mortality are thus unhealthy life styles (e.g. alcohol, 
smoking, high fat diet) and environmental hazards, as well the weaknesses of health 
systems in dealing with chronic diseases on one side and on the other the underestimation 
of death rates in the pre-1989 period and the cohort effect. The fall in marriage and 
fertility rates are associated with the adoption of 'individualistic Western values' and 
greater sexual freedom (Murray and Bobadilla 1995; Fenshbach and Friendly 1992).  
    Though all these factors will have had an impact on health they cannot convincingly 
account for the magnitude of a crisis or its particular focus on men. Also after 1989 environmental pollution declined (largely due to fall of output), and in the second half of 
the 1980s the downward health trends of the last decade started to improve.  
    There is growing evidence that stress could be a major factor behind the death crisis 
(Cornia 1996 and Cornia and Paniccia 1996). Sudden and poorly managed changes in the 
labour market (job insecurity, falls in wages, unemployment), impoverishment, growing 
inequalities and severe erosion of public goods such as law and order, health and 
education raised psychosocial stress. Threat to personal security due to military conflicts 
and violence added to this stress in many countries. Tensions within a family increased. 
Rapid changes in social hierarchy created stressful situations for the losers including the 
former 'labour elite' - the middle-aged, semi-skilled workers employed in heavy industry 
and party administration. They had to adjust to a loss of incomes and lifetime savings, as 
well as to a loss of self-respect and public recognition. The sense of deprivation was often 
deeper than the actual decline in incomes. Many people suffered from acute 
disorientation against the vanishing of skills and experience that once determined their 
social position. Anger, depression and helplessness, and a sense of failure drove up 
suicides and homicides in the region (table 11).  
Table 11- not yet available 
   
   
Access to health services  
    After 1989 public expenditures on health contracted in many countries largely due to 
the decline in GDP but in some countries, including Russia, also in relative terms (table 
10). There was, however, little downsizing and restructuring in the public health sector. 
The adjustment occurred through a reduction in capital expenditures and an erosion of 
real wages in the health sector rather than through cuts in medical personnel or 
privatization. In most countries, the number of medical staff and hospital beds per 
population remained unchanged.  
    The quality of basic health services, however, deteriorated. The lack of funds 
undermined everyday operations and the upgrading of old medical equipment and 
facilities. Underpaid doctors and health workers supplemented their incomes by 
moonlighting in the private sector and/or receiving unofficial out-of-pocket payments.  
    The privatization of health services was voluntary. It was most rapid in the area of 
dentistry and pharmaceuticals, slower for physicians and diagnostic services and 
negligible for hospital services. In view of the financial crisis, however, hospitals and 
other health institutions, introduced user fees -- often on an ad hoc, emergency basis 
(Goldstein et al. 1996). The cost of health care increased, with a few exceptions, in all 
countries in the region.  
    People with low incomes were most affected by the less equitable distribution of 
medical care and by deterioration in the quality of public services. They also faced great uncertainty regarding the type of health care they could afford in future. Most countries 
look now for ways to improve the efficiency of health spending and discuss options 
regarding the 'hard core' of public health care, including privatization and changes in 
medical insurance schemes. The question remains what provisions will be made to ensure 
adequate access to health services for poor people.  
The spread of STDs and HIV  
    In Eastern and Central Europe, except Romania, and in Central Asia, the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic is recent. In 1995 the highest rate per million (9.9) was found in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In some countries in the region -- Russia, the Baltic States and 
Ukraine -- a rapid spread of epidemics is indicated and is linked to drug abuse and 
sexually transmitted diseases (STD).  
Figure 7 - not yet available 
   
    In Ukraine HIV infection was first registered in 1987 and the prevalence of the disease 
was increasing slowly (averaging 10-30 cases per year). In 1995, however, the number of 
new HIV cases increased 34 times as compared to 1994 and the total number of people 
infected by HIV rose to 1,490. In Ukraine New HIV cases were diagnosed across all 
regions (with a few exceptions) and 70% of this was drug related. The threat of a further 
spread of HIV is reflected by the more than tenfold increase in the incidence of syphilis 
between 1991 and 1995 (UNAIDS 1996).  
    The rise of HIV is particularly noticeable in big cities such as Moscow or St. 
Petersburg and cities bordering the Black Sea. The pattern of HIV spread -- its 
relationship to STD, drugs and prostitution in urban centers -- is similar to that which 
occurred in South Asia (UNAIDs 1996).  
Trends in education  
    Changes in enrollment in public education mostly affected tertiary level and pre-school 
enrollment. Some countries also experienced adverse changes in primary enrollment. 
Between 1989 and 1995 primary enrollment rates declined by 2-3% in Moldova, Ukraine 
and Russia; by over 3% in Estonia; by over 4% in Bulgaria and more than 12% in 
Georgia (table 12).  
    Pre-primary enrollment declined substantially in many countries due to a drop in the 
supply of kindergarten places, the introduction of user fees, as well as a decline in female 
employment. Enrollment declined by as much as 10%-25% in countries with traditionally 
high coverage rates. In Lithuania only 36% of children aged 3-6 years go to kindergarten 
(as opposed to almost 64% in 1989) and in Russia 54% (as compared to 69% in 1989). 
According to UNICEF this trend is worrying as apart from their custodial role 
kindergartens play an educational function. Increasing educational problems among 
children entering the first grade of compulsory education have been reported in several countries including the Czech Republic (UNICEF 1995 p. 69). The introduction of user 
fees is particularly a barrier for low income families.  
Access to education  
    Since 1989 government expenditures on education have been erratic and affected by 
the contraction of GDP. The role of the state in the provision of basic education did not 
change much. The definition of free basic education, however, has become narrower and 
costs of education have increased (figure 7). Responsibility for pre-school age children 
was shifted from the government to parents. New legislation -- as in Poland and Russia -- 
emphasizes the complementary roles of states and families.  
    Public education systems, as with health systems, reduced costs through cutting 
subsidies on books or meals and for education at the primary and secondary level 
increased the share of out-of-pocket expenses -- such as for courses outside the 
mandatory curriculum. Underpaid teachers in public schools often seek part-time jobs - 
affecting the quality of teaching. In several countries, the gap between private and public 
education has widened.  
    In several newly independent states, such as the central Asian republics, education 
systems also face adjustment problems due to changes in the official language (from 
Russian). Under such conditions some people risk loss of basic literacy skills 
(Micklewright 1996).  
Personal security  
    After 1989 personal security in the region declined and people living in war-torn 
countries were most affected. The collapse of socialism revealed long suppressed ethnic 
conflicts and tensions. The split of two former federations: the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia was accompanied by military conflict and violence. As a result, about 45 
million people (excluding Russia) now live in countries affected by war or civil strife. 
Almost 400,000 have been killed. And some 5.5 million have become refugees or 
internally displaced (table 13).  
    War-torn countries also had a 40-80% drop in GDP and frequently faced a total 
collapse of the state which can no longer provide basic 'public goods' such as law and 
order or offer a basic safety net. In Georgia in 1993 the tax/GDP ratio fell to 2.6% -- a 
fifth of that of a poor African country -- and in early 1995 after efforts to improve tax 
collection, reached 3.5%. (UNICEF 1995 p. 16-17).  
    Living conditions in these countries are miserable. People face severe psychological 
traumas and fear for their lives. Many families have temporary housing - often straw 
houses or plywood barracks. In Azerbaijan 60,000 people live in tent camps with 
restricted access to food, medical services and education (Azerbaijan: NHDR 1996 p.25). 
In many countries, health and education infrastructures were severely damaged. In 
Bosnia one-third of all health facilities and half of the country's school buildings have been seriously damaged or destroyed along with 70% of total housing. The infant 
mortality rates in Bosnia doubled and food production satisfies only 35% of the country's 
needs (The World Bank: Transition November-December 1995).  
    The decline in personal security is also associated with a proliferation of corruption, 
fraud, illegal businesses (drugs, arms) and organized crime. The Russian mafia is not a 
single organization but a collection of 3,000-4,000 groups employing more than 25,000 
people with networks in many countries in the region. It controls key sectors of the 
economy -- the energy, gold and diamond industries -- and has a strong influence on the 
financial and business sector. The mafia force "loans" out of banks, and also blackmail 
and take over legitimate businesses. Mafia groups "help" banks and enterprises to collect 
debts or "protect" new businesses. The scope of mafia activities in Russia is 
unprecedented. Recently several dozen Russian bankers have been murdered. In 1993-
1994 the amount of money misappropriated from Russian banks through fake payments 
and documents and through false guarantees from foreign banks is estimated to no less 
than 4 trillion rubles (several hundred million dollars) ((World Bank 1996b p.97; 
Transition, November-December 1995; Economist 16 November 1996: interview with 
Russian Minister of Interior).  
    Though corruption and organized crime are a major concern in Russia, Lithuania, 
Ukraine and several CIS countries, similar groups operate in other countries. After 1989, 
crime increased in most countries including the Czech Republic and Hungary where the 
rates tripled (figures 8 and 9). The increase in crime reveals a weakness in the state and in 
public law enforcement. The old system has collapsed but it has not been replaced by a 
new one and the gaps are at times filled by others, including mafia groups. The 
consequences of this situation include rises in personal insecurity (particularly in the 
business community), the failure of many legitimate ventures and social losses due to rent 
seeking and tax evasion.  
Exclusion and participation  
    This section looks at changes in people's participation in (or exclusion from) emerging 
patterns of political, economic and social life. Despite expectations, lifting the restrictions 
on people's freedom did not improve across-the-board participation. Many people, 
defined by socio-economic group, gender or location, were left behind.  
Political participation  
    As a result of free elections, decentralization and the development of civil society gains 
in political participation were shared fairly widely. The rise of participation differed, 
however, by gender and women lost much of their political representation. Since 1989 
the number of women in national parliaments declined from 20%-40% to single digits, 
with a few exceptions, and is also low in governments and at the level of executive 
power.      Women's political losses are explained by many factors such as elimination of the 
quota system and the weakness of the women's movement. The aggressive nature of the 
post-1989 power struggle, lack of self-confidence and the passive and often negative 
attitudes of women towards politics also played a role. Women's attitudes towards 
politics were largely shaped by past experience when high political representation was 
not linked with an impact on decision making. Finally, time constraints and the revival of 
paternalistic tendencies discouraged women's political participation. Underrepresentation 
of women in democratic structures limits their impact on building new institutions, 
undermines their position in collective bargaining and could have adverse effects on 
women's position in a society, and ultimately human development prospects in the region 
(Ruminska-Zimny 1995).  
Economic participation  
    The rise in economic participation was uneven among social groups, individuals and 
by gender, and was largely determined by access to the private sector. True, opportunities 
differed by individual characteristics such as risk taking and readiness to work hard but in 
general access to the private sector was difficult for those who lost state jobs and the 
emerging private sector had a limited demand for their skills and experience. For former 
semi-skilled industry workers and the scientific-technical intelligentsia the market 
economy excluded many people from economic activities through long term 
unemployment and/or early retirement (Tchernina 1996 p.17).  
    Family run businesses, which account for a majority of private enterprises in the 
region, did not create enough new jobs. And larger companies, particularly those with 
foreign capital, set high education standards and a low age limit for hiring (30 years old, 
and often less). A middle-aged former steel worker from a state enterprise has few 
opportunities to create a job for himself or herself. Not only would he or she lack market 
skills and experience but they would have practically no assets or savings nor would they 
have the collateral to gain credit even if they could afford the high interest rates. State 
supported infrastructure promoting small business is still underdeveloped. And the only 
viable option for many former state employees or people pushed into early retirement has 
been to seek a job in the "shadow economy".  
    The role of the "shadow economy" in lifting people out of poverty is questionable. 
Recent studies from Poland and Hungary (GUS 1995) indicate that the distribution of 
incomes in the "shadow economy" is biased towards the rich. The lowest reported income 
quintile in Hungary received about 20% of "shadow incomes" while the highest about 
50% (quoted by Boyle Torrey et al. 1996 p. 5). The jobs poor people can get are low 
paid, short-term, and have no social benefits. Some also have limited work security since 
small companies -- as in buildings and construction - do not establish adequate work 
safety systems. Incomes from the "shadow economy" as a main source of income usually 
only allow poor people to float around the poverty line. The once new urban working 
class of the socialist era, as Julia Szalai describes for Hungary "if gradually forgotten 
during the final decades of socialism, .. also started to suffer full disenfranchisement in 
the new democracy" (Szalai 1992 p.40).      People in small towns and rural areas are also most frequently excluded from new 
opportunities due to the depressed local environment and low mobility. The exclusion of 
rural people in Russia -- who until the early 1960s had to have a passport to move freely 
around a country -- is described by Tchernina (1996 p. 69). Former "kolkozes" which lost 
state support -- now peasant farm associations or stock companies -- are ill-prepared to 
face the market system and many are on the verge of ruin. A survey of living conditions 
of the rural population in the Nowosibirsk region (1994) revealed that expenditures for 
food exceeded 90% of family budgets in 59% of families (a similar share of families 
lived on per capita income below subsistence minimum).  
    Low labour mobility is associated with low supply of reasonably priced housing--a 
legacy of the past and slow development of new forms of housing credit and reforms of 
the housing market. Gaps in legislation regulating housing and land markets have been 
the source for legal or illegal profits for a small segment of the population (UNDP 
1996b). In capital cities, where the demand for labour is high, housing costs are 
prohibitive but rents and housing are now also expensive in many provincial cities. The 
market price for a two-room apartment (50m_) in Khabarowsk in Russia was US$ 30,000 
in 1994. And the average annual wage in this region represented about 3% of this figure. 
The housing problem has been aggravated by a decline in new construction of around 40-
50 % in most transition countries and up to over 70-80% in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
((UNICEF 1995 p. 80).  
Social exclusion  
    The transition process has caused rapid changes not only in economic conditions but 
also in value systems and in the way people feel about themselves. From this perspective, 
social exclusion has many sources such as loss of previously acquired rights and position, 
a lack of access to the "typical" lifestyle (including that based on expectations) and 
difficulties in adjusting to a value system based on a market philosophy.  
    Many people in Russia, the countries of eastern Europe, and elsewhere in the region 
feel excluded because they are insecure, are struggling for subsistence and need to 
'reproduce' the economizing skills of the pre-war poor -- reducing their use of heating, 
canceling elementary services (such as school meals for children) and delaying 
replacement of used clothes. These 'survival' strategies -- their parents thought they had 
left behind for ever -- are humiliating particularly for people in countries with higher 
standards such as Hungary (Szalai 1992).  
    Some people feel excluded because they do not adjust to rapid diversification of 
incomes and lifestyles or because they compare their living standard to their expectations. 
Many people are also confused about the value system which is now a mix of equity and 
solidarity of the past and profit-driven behaviour. Women in Kyrgiz Republic report that 
selling home-grown produce is stressful -- in their culture extra food within a family was 
always given, and not sold, to neighbors in need (World Bank 1996 p.72).      Homeless people -- a new phenomenon in the region -- represent an extreme case of 
social exclusion in the transition process. Anecdotal evidence comes mainly from capitals 
-- Warsaw, Budapest, Moscow -- and from large urban areas. According to the Russian 
Ministry of Social Protection about 60,000 children may live on the streets of Moscow 
(UNICEF 1995 p.81). According to police in Moscow 20,000 people in this city are 
homeless (New York Times 15 Oct. 1996).  
    Paradoxically, new political rights played a role in increasing the number of homeless 
people in many countries. Forcefully detained or hospitalized under the former regime 
`deviants', alcoholics and vagabonds, who rarely had a home or a family, were largely 
released to freedom in all countries in the region after 1989. Without social assistance 
these people had no place to go and no income to live on (Szalai 1994).  
   
Summary and conclusions  
    The transition process affected the non-income dimensions of people's lives including 
basic capabilities. Death rates increased and life expectancy declined particularly in 
Russia, the Baltic States and most CIS countries. Personal insecurity increased and in 
war-torn countries is a threat to life. Corruption and crime often results in ruthless 
redistribution of assets and of access to resources. Primary enrollment in several 
countries, including Russia, was affected.  
    Establishing a market democracy increased political participation, but women's share 
in political representation was reduced. And many people were excluded from gains 
associated with economic freedom and entrepreneurship. Society became polarized into a 
rich minority and a poor majority particularly in Russia. Large social groups -- the 
grandchildren of the once-elevated peasant workers -- suddenly found themselves 
second-class citizens since with low incomes they had little access to quality health and 
often education. The outlook for middle-aged people with little schooling, living in small 
towns or rural areas became bleak.  
    Personal insecurity, ill health, loss of self-respect, a sense of failure and social 
exclusion narrowed down the opportunities for many people to live the life they value. 
Though often linked to income poverty, these non-income aspects of deprivation stand 
alone as a determinant of a low quality of life. Erosion of traditionally high stock of 
health and education in the region and weakness of law enforcement and governance 
system question sustainability of growth and human development in the region.  
   
Prospects for poverty eradication  
   
    The views on how fast people in transition countries will benefit from systemic 
transformation are now less optimistic. Although it is true that progress toward market 
democracy has been substantive in many countries, social costs of the transition process 
are high and persistent, even for the most advanced reformers who have improved indicators for economic performance as well as selected social indicators. These costs 
also have many non-income dimensions such as erosion of basic capabilities (health and 
education), personal insecurity and psycho-social stress.  
    It is still being debated whether some of these costs could be avoided. Clearly their 
extent had been largely undervalued at the beginning of the transition process, as many 
advocates of shock therapy admit (Gomulka 1995). When socialism collapsed no one 
knew exactly what policies would work to transform centrally planned economies into 
market democracies. The adopted strategy was based on a liberalization and stabilization 
package, similar to structural adjustment programmes, designed by the World Bank for 
many developing countries during the 1980's. Entrepreneurship and market forces, once 
freed by bold institutional reforms, were believed to improve rapidly people's lives 
through economic growth. Deterioration of social well being, including unemployment 
and poverty, was supposed to be transient.  
    Against the experience of seven years this strategy is now critically evaluated under 
social pressure as initial post-1990 governments have been voted out or parliamentary 
majorities have been altered in all countries. The need for market reforms and growth in 
transition countries is not denied but the problem of how to compensate the losers 
remains central to policy debates in the region. For many countries, particularly in less 
advanced reformers with high poverty rates income poverty is likely to stay even if 
growth rates accelerate. A reduction of income poverty to 10% in Kyrgyzstan, for 
example, will take up to 11 years, and not much less in Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, or Ukraine, even under a favourable scenario of 5% average growth rates, 
and stabilization of income inequalities (Milanovic 1996 p. 103-104, based on $4 poverty 
line). This may be too long to prevent the formation of an underclass of poor people, 
which so far, is an exception.  
    Market and growth alone did not, and could not, solve institutional and structural 
problems of the transition process (Reyment 1996). Unemployment rates in all countries 
in Eastern Europe (except for the Czech Republic), for example, remain high despite the 
expansion of the private sectors which is largely explained by a mismatch between the 
demand for and supply of skills (particularly for workers with vocational training). So 
far, there is also little evidence that growth reduces income poverty. In Poland, the only 
transition country which experienced five years of consecutive rapid growth, income 
poverty stabilized and did not decline. Again, structural causes including regional 
differences in economic activities and poverty rates largely explain this situation 
(Golinowska 1996). And in Hungary deep pockets of income poverty have emerged 
despite progress in market reforms (World Bank 1996c).  
    Poverty eradication requires decisive action at the policy level to be undertaken within 
a broader strategy based on the concept of human development. The latter does not 
undermine the importance of economic growth and a well functioning market. But the 
role of the state should be reevaluated, and in many areas strengthened, against the 
division of responsibilities between the state, the market and civil society. The state 
should take a lead in establishing anti-poverty policies, consistent with macroeconomic policies, and designed to address various dimensions of human poverty. Anti-poverty 
policies should embody active labour market policies including job creation (through 
retraining or public works), support for small business, increase of labour mobility 
(through housing policies), reversal of the erosion of public health and education, 
provision of effective protection for those left behind by market forces and strengthening 
of personal security. Also more attention should be paid to the distributive aspects of the 
transition process in regional and socio-economic perspective including gender.  
    Anti-poverty policies are closely linked to the reform of the welfare system and 
redistribution of universal system of entitlement. Though the necessity of downsizing the 
welfare system and more targeted benefits is commonly accepted there is a lot of 
uncertainty on what options will be chosen. In designing a new welfare system countries 
face a difficult dilemma of who should get priority in social protection against the 
shortage of resources -- children or elderly. Countries could consider a three-tiered 
systems where the state would secure the first component would be compulsory and the 
second employment related insurance, and the third voluntary and based on additional 
private insurance.  
    So far the process of adjustment of the welfare system to market condition has been 
slow and has had little social support. Against the lack of a longer term vision of the 
welfare system, decisions on social protection have been often taken on an adhoc basis 
and under pressure from the strongest groups. Welfare reform is very sensitive politically 
in all countries and requires minimum consensus on a new social contract which will 
define how much each society values solidarity and what welfare system it can afford.  
    The discussion of anti-poverty policies have to also consider the rapid diversification 
of the situations of individual countries. Many CIS countries, for example, are still 
missing basic market institutions, struggle to recover from economic collapse, and face 
problems similar to those of developing countries. At the same time countries in Eastern 
Europe, with few exceptions, enjoy positive growth rates of up to 6-7% and move 
decisively towards integration with developed market economies within the OECD and 
European Union. This diversity requires more careful analysis of social costs, and sets of 
policies which would address these problems in individual countries.  
    International assistance is crucial in providing support to transition countries in 
establishing and implementing anti-poverty policies. This should include additional 
technical and financial assistance and social know-how to all countries who request 
assistance. A failure to establish effective policies aimed at the reversal of negative trends 
in human development in the region carries high risks-political instability, lack of human 
security and undermines chances for sustainable development and proliferation of 
poverty beyond `manageable' proportions.  
Lessons from the transition process  
    From the perspective of almost seven years of transition at least three lessons can be 
learnt. The first lesson is obvious -- that transition takes time and has high human costs. The second lesson is that growth alone will not eradicate human poverty. And the third 
lesson is that a rethinking the transition strategy is needed based on a concept of human 
development which should be looked at as an end in itself and a condition for 
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Annex: National Poverty Measures  
   
In most former socialist countries the monitoring of living standards became more regular 
in the 1980s when social conditions deteriorated. Quality of research including survey 
designs and reliability of data varied among countries. The best household surveys, 
comparable in many ways to western standards, were carried in Hungary, Poland and the 
former Czechoslovakia. Family budget surveys in Russia suffered from serious 
shortcomings -- faulty sampling where the poor were underrepresented, overstatement of 
average incomes and underestimation of income inequalities (McAuley 1996). Similarly, 
Bulgarian and Romanian research on living standards were of low quality. The design of 
household surveys in Russia and Bulgaria has been improved during transition.  
National standards to estimate living standards of household in socialism were based on 
two different concepts of needs. "Subsistence minimum" referred to basic needs and was 
calculated slightly above physiological needs. "Social minimum" drew on a broader 
concept of needs "widely justified by the society at the given general economic, social 
and cultural level " (assuming rational economic behavior and modest levels of 
satisfaction, Salamin quoted in Atkinson and Micklewright, p. 193). The difference 
between the two minima was usually 15-20%. Some countries, as Poland, carried also 
research on "subjective income poverty" that is self-evaluated inadequacy of a person's 
income.  
Despite conceptual similarities in defining "subsistence" and "social" minima, the 
methodology of calculating and updating of income minima differed significantly among 
countries. In Poland and Hungary, for example, income minima were indexed on prices 
while in the former Czechoslovakia on average income. In most countries, one of the 
income minima (subsistence or social), emerged with time as a national poverty line 
and/or as upper and lower poverty lines.  
Income minima in socialist countries were considered rather high which was often 
explained by the lack of their direct link to government finance (in particular for social 
minimum: Barr 1992). During the 1980s the level of income minima, however, declined 
in most countries including through lowering standards for caloric intakes and ratios. In the late 1980s an adult man in Russia was considered poor when he ate less than 64 kilos 
of meat a year; this ratio has been lowered to 54 kilos and then to 27 kilos (quoted by 
Standing 1995b p. 5).  
Since 1989 national poverty lines have been based on subsistence minimum (revised for 
recent consumption patterns). Calculation of social minima has been practically 
abandoned in most countries. Such a threshold resulted in very high incidence of poverty. 
In 1992 some 90% of people in Russia were poor by the standard of the old Soviet 
national poverty line (McAuley 1996). In Poland around 50 per cent of people lived 
below the poverty line based on social minimum in 1994 (Golinowska 1995).  
Except in the Czech Republic and Estonia, subsistence minima do not set eligibility 
criteria for social benefits. This is, however, less relevant under present conditions when 
social assistance, and even incomes from work, are below subsistence levels in a number 
of countries. In Lithuania the real value of social assistance in early 1994 was only 22 per 
cent of subsistence level (Lazutka and Sniukstiene 1995). Also minimum wage in Russia 
and in Ukraine represented only a fraction of substance minimum that is 25 per cent 
(1993) and 7 per cent (1994) respectively (ILO-CEET 1994).  
 
 
1  This paper has greatly benefited from the comments of Richard Jolly, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Giovanni 
Andrea Cornia and from the discussion with Branco Milanovic, Gaspar Fajth, John Micklewright, Jeanine 
Braithwaite, Guy Standing, Stanislawa Golinowska, Jan Rutkowki, Omar Noman as well as the members 
of the HDRO team. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion 
of UNDP.  
2  Lenin in an article in January 1918 wrote that " he who does not work, neither shall he eat". This 
quotation was often used later as the official credo of socialism (Carr 1966 p.114).  
3  Official attitude was, however, sympathetic and supportive towards the "old" poor, victims of pre-war 
capitalism, such as illiterate or rural poor. It should also be mentioned that official attitudes towards the 
poor "softened" during the last decade of socialism.  
4  These incomes include the legitimate ("grey" economy) and illegal activities such as income from drug 
trafficking ("black economy"). Since 1989 the share of the "shadow" economy in GDP increased in all 
countries. The Czech Republic now has the lowest share with 8-10% of GDP (Kadara 1995). In Poland the 
"shadow economy" is some 25-30% of GDP (GUS 1995), and perhaps more in Russia and many other 
countries. There are also high variations by country between legal and illegal component of the "shadow 
economy".  
5  This figure do not take into account incomes in -kind and from 'shadow economy' and most likely 
overestimates poverty.  
6  It is usually assumed that at the very minimum average wage would be twice the (per capita) poverty line 
which should allow a family of two working adults with two children to stay above poverty line.  
7 "The shallowness of the income poverty in transition economies implies that even a relatively small 
increase in growth can lift significant numbers of people out of poverty" (World Bank1996a p. 9).   